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1. Does a landlord's refusal to rent to an unmarried couple 
violate the California Fair Employment and Housing Act which 
proscribes discrimination on the basis of marital status?
2. Does application of either the Smith "incidental 
effects" test or the Sherbert-Yoder "compelling interest" test in 
a secular and commercial context obligate a landlord to comply 
with a state law designed to eradicate marital status 
discrimination in housing, despite that law’s unintended effect of 
burdening the landlord's religious beliefs which prohibit her from 
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KENNETH C. PHILLIPS and }
GAIL RANDALL, )
)
Real Parties in Interest. )
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
On Original Petition for Review From a Decision by the 
Fair Employment and Housing Commission
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
Kenneth Phillips and Gail Randall ("Phillips" and "Randall"), an 
unmarried couple, filed individual complaints with the Department of 
Fair Emplowent and Housing ("DFEH") alleging that Evelyn Smith’s 
("Smith") refusal to rent them a one-bedroom apartment based upon 
their marital status violated the California Fair Employment and 
Housing Act ("FEHA"), Government Code sections 12948 and 12955 (West 
Supp. 1995), which prohibits a landlord from discriminating against 
prospective tenants on the basis of marital status. (C.T. 3.)
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The Fair Employment and Housing Commission ("Commission") 
conducted an administrative hearing pursuant to an accusation issued 
by the DFEH charging Smith with unlawful discrimination. (C.T. 3.)
At this hearing. Smith argued that enforcement of FEHA would 
impermissibly infringe upon her constitutionally protected right to 
the free exercise of religion by requiring her to rent to people who 
will engage in nonmarital sex on her property, which according to 
Smith's beliefs constitutes a sin. (C.T. 11-12.) Since the 
California Constitution precluded the Commission from refusing to 
enforce FEHA or declaring FEHA invalid unless an appellate court 
first found the Act to be unconstitutional, the Commission declined 
to consider Smith's constitutional defense. (C.T. 11.) The 
Commission found that Smith unlawfully discriminated against Phillips 
and Randall on the basis of their marital status and awarded damages 
to Phillips and Randall. (C.T. 12-13.) The Commission also ordered 
Sm.ith to post and distribute notices at her apartment building 
informing potential tenants of the Commission's ruling and their 
rights and remedies under FEHA. (C.T. 13-15.)
Smith filed an appeal for an alternative writ of mandate in the 
Court of Appeal, Third District, seeking a reversal of the 
Commission's ruling. (C.T. 19-23.) The court of appeal reversed, 
holding that the Commission's order penalizing Smith for marital 
status discrimination in housing violated her constitutional right to 
the free exercise and enjoyment of religion. Smith v. Fair 
■Employment & Hous. Comm'n . 34 Cal. App. 4th 1708, 1709 (1994), 
review granted Sept. 8, 1994 {S040653).
The Commission now appeals to this Court. (C.T. 61-62.) On 
September 8, 1994, this Court granted reviev;. (C.T. 64.)
Statement of Facts
On April 1, 1987, Phillips and Randall read an advertisement in 
the Chico Enterprise Record announcing a vacancy in one of the four 
rental units owned and leased by Smith in Chico, California. (C.T. 
4.) Phillips and Randall drove by the advertised unit that night and 
immediately took a special interest in the unit because of its 
particular neighborhood, attractive architecture, convenient 
location, and well maintained grounds. (C.T. 4.) They called Smith 
the next morning to arrange a time to view the unit. (C.T. 4.} In 
the course of that telephone conversation, Smith stated that she 
preferred to rent to married couples based on her religious beliefs 
that sex outside of marriage is sinful and that God will judge her i 
she permits people to engage in extra-marital sex in her rental 
units. (C.T. 3-4.) Smith does not occupy any of the units and 
visits only occasionally for maintenance purposes. (C.T. 3.)
Phillips and Randall met with Smith on the premises of the 
rental unit on April 2, 1987. (C.T. 4.) During that meeting,
Phillips and Randall falsely represented that they were married v;her. 
Smith asked how long they had been wed, and Randall signed her nam.e 
as "Gail Phillips" on an application form. (C.T. 4.) Phillips and 
Randall later called Smith to express their continued interest in 
renting the unit and met with her once more on April 7, 1987. (C.T.
4-5.) The parties executed a lease agreement on this date and 
Phillips and Randall paid a security deposit. (C.T. 5.) Several 
hours later, Phillips called Smith to inform her that he and Randall 
were not married. (C.T. 5.) Smith responded by stating that she 




convictions and that she would return their deposit, which she did. 
(C.T. 5.)
After an exhaustive but unsuccessful seven month search for 
alternative housing in the Chico area, Phillips and Randall were 
forced to lease a one-bedroom house inconveniently located in a town 
thirty miles away and at a price approximately 25 percent higher than 
Smith’s rental unit. (C.T. 5.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Government Code section 12955 protects unmarried couples from 
housing discrimination. Hess v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm.'n. 156 
Cal. App. 3d 232, 235 (1982). The statute specifically provides 
protection based on "marital status." The term "marital status," as 
intended by the legislature, interpreted by the courts of this 
state, and consistent with existing policies and laws in California, 
includes unmarried couples. Other jurisdictions have interpreted 
similar "marital status" provisions to include unmarried couples. 
Therefore, the term "marital status" includes unmarried couples as a 
matter of lav;.
Accordingly, Smith violated FEHA by refusing to rent to 
Phillips and Randall. The proper judicial standard to determine 
whether to exempt Smith's violation of section 12955 on the basis of 
her religious beliefs is the "incidental effects" test, set forth b\’ 
the United States Supreme Court in Employment Division. Departmenr 
of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Inasmuch as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") attempts 
to unconstitutionally usurp the judiciary's power by replacing the 
"incidental effects" test with a standard previously rejected by the 
Court, it is invalid and inapplicable. Alternatively, even if this
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Court departs from established law and applies the stricter 
"compelling interest" test, the Commission can discharge such a 
burden.
Neither the Smith "incidental effects" test nor the Sherbert- 
Yoder "compelling interest" test excuses this landlord's refusal to 
rent to unmarried couples in violation of section 12955. The 
"incidental effects" test mandates that Smith comply with section 
12955 due to the statute’s generally applicable, religion-neutral 
nature. See Smith. 494 U.S. at 886 n.3.
Even under the more demanding Sherbert-Yoder test, California’s 
compelling interest in eradicating invidious housing discrimination 
against unmarried couples outweighs the burden imposed upon Smith’s 
free exercise liberties, again permitting enforcement of section 
12955. See VJisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1972);
.Sherbert v. Verner. 374 U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963). In addition, 
issuance of a religious exemption to Smith would substantially 
frustrate the state's narrowly tailored and overriding interest in 
eliminating harmful discriminatory acts, thus rendering the entire 
statutory scheme unworkable by placing religiously motivated conduct 
beyond the reach of a valid state lav.-. See United States v. Lee.
455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982); Braunfeld v. Brown. 366 U.S. 599, 605-06 
{I960).
ARGUMENT
I. THE MARITAL STATUS CATEGORY OF THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING
ACT PROTECTS UNMARRIED COUPLES FROM DISCRIMINATION.
The phrase "marital status" as a matter of statutory 
construction includes unmarried couples. This interpretation is
5
supported by the legislative intent of FEHA and case lav; from both
California and other United States jurisdictions.
Because this case presents a question of law, the proper review
is de novo. Hadian v. Schwartz. 8 Cal. 4th 836, 842 n.l (1994) .
A. The California Legislature intended to place unmarried
couples under the protective marital status provisions of
the Fair Employment and Housing Act.
In determining legislative intent, a court first looks to the 
words of the statute. People v. Overstreet. 42 Cal. 3d 891, 895 
(1986). When the language of the statute is ambiguous and subject tQ> 
more than one reasonable interpretation, a court then looks to a 
variety of factors which include the legislative history of the 
statute, the objective of the statute, the purpose of the statute, 
the statutory scheme, and public policy considerations. People v. 
Woodhead. 43 Cal. 3d 1002, 1008 (1987).
FEHA provides in part:
It shall be unlawful:
(a) For the owner of any housing accommodation to 
discriminate against any person because of the race, color, 
religion, sex, marital status, national origin, ancestry, 
familial status or disability of that person.
(b) For the ovmer of any housing accommodation to make 
or to cause to be made any written or oral inquiry 
concerning the race, color, religion, sex, marital status, 
national origin, ancestry, familial status or disability of 
any person seeking to purchase, rent or lease any housing 
accommodation.
Cal. Govt Code § 12955 (West Supp. 1995).^
In order to ascertain the meaning of a statute, legislative 
intent is vital. Overstreet. 42 Cal. 3d at 895. With the enactm^ent 
of section 12955, the California Legislature intended to eliminate
Unless otherwise indicated, all further references are to the California 
Governinent Code.
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housing discrimination within prescribed categories listed in that 
section.
1. A plain reading of section 12955 indicates that as a
matter of traditional statutory constrnrtion marital
status includes unmarried couples.
Traditional statutory interpretation considers such factors as 
the plain meaning of the words in the statute, cases that have 
provided alternative explanations to such words, and the context of 
the words used. Woodhead. 43 Cal. 3d at 1008; Strang v, Cabrol. 37 
Cal. 3d 720, 724 (1984); Campbell v. State Bd. of Dental Examiners.
53 Cal. App. 3d. 283, 285 (1975).
A plain reading of section 12955 evinces that marital status 
includes unmarried couples. See VJoodhead. 43 Cal. 3d at 1008. The 
term, "status" as used in the context of section 12955 suggests that 
every person possesses a "status." The term "marital status" can 
encompass many situations. In attempting to ascertain the meaning of 
an ambiguous phrase within a statute, words should be given their 
ordinary and common meaning. Foreman v. Anchorage Ecaial Rights 
Comm'n. 779 P . 2d 1199, 1201 (Alaska 1989).
In Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission.
54 Cal. 3d 245, 268 (1991), this Court looked to Webster's Dictionary 
as well as Black's Lav.* Dictionary to ascertain the plain meaning of 
an ambiguous statutory term. Webster's defines "status" as "the 
condition of a person or thing in the eyes of the law." Webster's 
f^eventh New Collegiate Dictionary 856 (4th ed. 1972). Black’s Lav.’ 
Dictionary defines "status" as "standing; state or condition; social 
position; the legal relation of individual to rest of the community .
. . not a mere relation." Black's Law Dictionary 1410 (6th ed.
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1991). From the definitions provided by these two sources, status 
expresses a condition which every person possesses at any point in 
time. The condition or state of an unmarried couple is also a status 
-- the marital status of being "unmarried."
No persuasive reason justifies departing from the traditional 
dictionary definition of "status." Cf. People v. Craft, 41 Cal. 3d 
554, 560 (1986), reh'a denied Apr. 30, 1986 (relying on dictionary 
meaning for ambiguous interpretation of word in criminal statute). 
Characterizing the status of an "unmarried couple" as anything other 
than their marital status amounts to an attempt to deceive this Court 
of the true meaning of the word. "Interpretive constructions which .
. . defy common sense, or lead to . . . absurdity, are to be
avoided." California Mfrs. Ass’n v. Public Util. Comm'n. 24 Cal. 3d 
836, 840 (1979).
The plain interpretive meaning of "marital status" properly 
focuses on status rather than conduct of an individual or couple. 
Thus, any arg’oment considering conduct in defining "marital status" 
is meritless and must be rejected for the same reasons articulated by 
courts outside of California. In Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Riah-p
Comjnission, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska), cert, denied. __ U.S. __ (1994),
the Alaska Supreme Court rejected Swanner‘s claim that unmarried 
cohabitation is not a status but rather conduct unprotected by the 
marital status ambit. Id. at 278. In rejecting Swanner's claim, the 
court stated:
Swanner cannot reasonably claim that he does not rent or 
show property to cohabiting couples based on their conduct 
(living together outside of marriage) and not their marital 
status when their marital status (unmarried) is what makes 
their conduct immoral in his opinion. The undisputed facts 
demonstrate that Swanner would have rented to the 
prospective tenants if they were married. Swanner's
argument that he discriminated against the prospective 
tenants based on their conduct and not their marital status 
is without merit.
Id. at 287.
Similarly in Attorney General v. Desilets. 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 
1994), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected the 
conduct-status distinction. Id. at 235. The court concluded that 
"[an] analysis of the defendant's concerns shows that it [was] 
marital status, not sexual intercourse that [was] at the heart of 
defendant's objection." Id.
In the instant case, Smith's concern turns not on the act of 
sexual intercourse but rather on whether the prospective tenants are 
married. (C.T. 5.) Thus, Smith’s concern focuses upon the couple's 
status, not their conduct. See Desilets. 636 N.E.2d at 235.
2 . The legislative history of section 12955 reveals that
the legislature intended the marital status provision
to protect unmarried couples.
The preamble to FEHA states:
[H]ousing purpose[:]
[Tjhe practice of discrimination because of race, 
color, religion, sex marital status, national origin, or 
ancestry in housing accommodations is declared to be against 
public policy.
It is the purpose of this part to provide effective 
remedies which will eliminate such discriminatory practices.
This part shall be deemed an exercise of the police 
power of the state for the protection of the welfare, 
health, and peace of the people of this state.
Cal. Gov't Code § 12920 (West 1994).
This broad language demonstrates the legislature's intent to
protect individuals against discrimination based on certain
characteristics. Smith's refusal to rent to Phillips and Randall
violates the broad purpose of FEHA. See Cal. Gov't Code § 12920.
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Further evidence of the legislature’s intent to enact a broad 
marital status provision is seen in a letter sent by the California 
Association of Realtors to Governor Brown on September 18, 1975. In 
that letter, the Association voiced its concern that FEHA might 
prohibit landlords from rejecting potential tenants with disagreeable 
lifestyles. (C.T. 46.) Although the Association directed its 
concerns to "communes and homosexuals," it nevertheless interpreted 
section 12955 to provide broad protection under the marital status 
provision. (C.T. 46.)
In a separate letter sent to Governor Brown by Nicholas C. 
Petris, Chairman of the California Legislature's Senate Select 
Committee on Housing and Urban Affairs, Petris urged the Governor to 
adopt FEHA, a bill which his Committee sponsored. (C.T. 50.) The 
letter expressed concerns that without this legislation, landlords 
would discriminate against people who were not a part of a "nuclear 
family." ,C.T. 50.) Thus, the authors of FEHA intended that the 
marital status category broadly and equitably apply in order to 
prevent unlawful housing discrimination.
3. The university housing exemption demonstrates a
legislative intent to protect unmarried couples frnr-
housina discrimination in all other contexts.
If s : Atute contains an exception to an otherwise general rule, 
no other exception should be implied in determining legislative 
intent. I(jildlife Alive v. Chickerina. 18 Cal. 3d 190, 194 (1976).
Wildlife Alive, the Court found that where exceptions to a general 
rule are specified by statute, other exceptions cannot be implied or 
presumed. Id. at 194. In the present case, section 12995(a) (2) 
specifically exempts college and university housing designated for
married students from the proscription against marital status 
discrimination. Cal. Gov't Code § 12995(a)(2). Therefore, because 
the legislature explicitly excepted university housing from section 
12955, the legislature intended that to be the sole exception. See 
Wildlife Alive, 18 Cal. 3d at 194. If the legislature intended 
section 12955 to exclude unmarried couples from protection, inclusion 
of "marital status" in the statue serves no purpose. By writing and 
enacting a separate code section, the legislature intentionally 
provided an exception, indicating that it was its original intent to 
include unmarried cohabiting couples within the protection of section 
12955.
The legislature has amended California section 12955 three times 
since Atkisson v. Kern County Housing Authority. 59 Cal. App. 3d 89 
(1976), and two times since Hess. 138 Cal. App. 3d 232. Both cases 
found that unmarried couples were protected under the marital status 
aiTJoit. Hess. 138 Cal. App. 3d at 235; Atkisson. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 
99. The legislature's silence therefore indicates that the courts 
have properly interpreted the legislature's original intent. When 
the legislature amends a statute without altering portions of the 
provision previously construed by the courts, the legislature is 
presumed to be aware of and acquiesce to the judicial construction. 
Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV. 52 Cal. 3d 1142, 1156 (1991) 
(citing Marina Point Ltd, v. Wolfson. 30 Cal. 3d 721, 734, cert. 
denied. 459 U.S. 858 (1982)).
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4. California's absence of criminal penalties for 
unmarried cohabitation and fornication indicates th^r
the marital status category includes unmarried
couples■
In determining legislative intent with regard to "marital 
status," courts in other jurisdictions have looked to whether a 
particular status was illegal when the state enacted the statute.
For example, in Foreman. the court noted that the Alaska Legislature 
passed a sta:jte prohibiting "marital status" discrimination 
subsequent to its 1978 repeal of a law criminalizing unmarried 
cohabitation. Foreman. 779 P.2d at 1202. The court found that the 
repealed law was "out of step with the constitutional and social 
development of the time" and held that it would be "manifestly 
unreasonable to limit the effect of . . . modern remedial provisions 
by reference to an outdated criminal statute which was repealed."
Id. at 1202.
California has never criminalized unmarried cohabitation. The 
lack of any anti-fornication law indicates California's willingness 
to recognize the right of its citizens to freely choose their 
lifestyles. The legislature enacted FEHA within this background and 
history. if the legislature intended to limit the protection 
afforded under marital status, it would have been more specific, 
especially in light of the court of appeal decisions in Hess, 138 
Cal. App. 3d 232, and Atkisson. 59 Cal. App. 3d 89.
5. Public policy supports protection of unmarried couple^c
from discrimination in housing.
In attempting to ascertain legislative intent, courts frequently 
consider public policy. Woodhead. 43 Cal. 3d at 1008. For a 
discussion of public policy, see infra part III.B.2-3.
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B. case law supports a broad reading of the marital
Status prQvision in the Fair Employment and Housing Act.
California appellate courts have determined that unmarried 
couples fall under the ambit of marital status. Hess. 138 Cal. App. 
3d at 235; Atkisson, 59 Cal. App. 3d 99. This interpretation squares 
with the legislature's intent to afford protection to these groups.
In Hess, the court held that section 12955 protects unmarried 
couples from housing discrimination. Id. at 235. There, a landlord 
denied a couple the opportunity to rent a duplex based on their 
unmarried status. at 234. The landlord applied one financial
criterion to married couples and another to unmarried couples. Id. 
The Commission determined that the landlord discriminated against the 
couple based on their marital status. I^ at 236. The court of 
appeal upheld this decision stating that "the California Fair 
Employment and Housing Act prohibits discrimination based on marital 
status including that of unmarried couples." Id. at 235. The court 
found no legitimate business purpose justifying the landlord's 
practice. Id,, at 236. The court's holding in Hess broadly provides 
that FEHA's marital status protection includes unmarried couples.
Id.
The court in Atkisson, held that a county housing authority 
regulation which prohibited tenants in low income public housing from 
living with someone of the opposite sex unrelated by blood, marriage 
or adoption, violated California Health and Safety Code section 35720 
{FEHA's predecessor statute). Atkisson. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 99. In 
that case, the plaintiff moved into a low income housing complex with 
her children. Id. After living there a few months, an unrelated 
adult male moved in with the mother, and the two resided as an
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unmarried couple. Id. The court found the regulation's language 
unconstitutional and unenforceable because of the prohibition against 
unmarried cohabitation. Id. at 100. The court also noted that the 
housing authority’s regulations violated Atkisson's equal protection, 
due process, and civil rights. Id. at 95.
Similar to Hess and Atkisson. Smith's discriminatory conduct 
against Randall and Phillips violated California law. See Hess. 138 
Cal. App. 3d at 235; Atkisson. 59 Cal. App. 3d 99. This Court should 
adopt the rationale of Hess and Atkisson for several reasons. First, 
California courts of appeal have reviewed the law and the 
legislature's intent and have consistently found that the marital 
status provision protects unmarried couples. See Hess. 138 Cal. App. 
3d at 236. Second, these cases represent the equitable solution to 
discriminatory practices. Finally, for the past nineteen years, the 
law in California has protected unmarried couples under section 
12955. Disrupting this consistency and reliability contravenes the 
legislature's original purpose for enacting section 12955. See Cal. 
Gov't Code § 12920.
On other occasions this Court has ruled on related issues 
regarding the rights of unmarried couples. In Marvin v. Marvin. 18 
Cal. 3d 660 (1976), this Court enforced an agreement between an 
unmarried couple in the absence of meretricious consideration. id. 
at 665. By recognizing enforceable rights held by unmarried couples, 
this Court indicated its willingness as a matter of public policy to 
recognize "unmarried couples" as a marital status. Id. "[An 
unmarried couple] may order their economic affairs as they choose, 
and no policy precludes the courts from enforcing such agreements." 
Id. at 674.
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California’s recognition of the rights of unmarried couples is 
also evident in Trutalli v. Meravialia. 215 Cal. 698 (1932). There, 
the court established the principle that non-marital partners may 
lawfully contract for the ownership of property acquired during their 
relationship. Id. at 701; see also Vallera v. Vallera. 21 Cal. 2d 
681, 685 (1943) (reaffirming this principle). In light of these 
cases, ample authority supports the proposition that section 12955's 
marital status provisions protect unmarried couples. Cf. Marvin, 18 
Cal. 3d at 665; Trutalli. 215 Cal. at 701.
C. Other United States jurisdictions have included unmarried
couples within the protection of the marital status ambit.
States with laws similar to California’s have found unmarried 
couples protected under the marital status ambit. The Supreme Court 
of Alaska ruled that the state's housing regulations proscribing 
discrimination based on marital status protected unmarried couples. 
■Swanner. 874 P.2d at 278. The Swanner court held that a landlord 
had discriminated against an unmarried couple based on their marital 
status. Id. The court rejected the landlord's claim that he was 
discriminating based on conduct not status, reasoning that had the 
couple been married their conduct would not have been an issue. Id.
In Desilets. the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found 
marital status discrimination against an unmarried couple, under the 
state's housing act. Desilets. 636 N.E.2d at 320. The court held 
that the landlord unlawfully discriminated against the couple based 
on their unmarried marital status rather than their conduct. Id. at 
320. In reaching this conclusion, the court looked at the plain 
language of the statute and found that marital status applies to 
discrimination against an unmarried woman and an unmarried man
seeking to rent an apartment for their joint occupancy. Id. at 320. 
The court pointed out the landlord's flawed reasoning using the 
following illustration:
If married couple A wanted to cohabit in an apartment owned 
by the defendants, they would have no objection. If 
unmarried couple B wanted to cohabit in an apartment owned 
by the defendants, they would have great objection. The 
controlling and discriminating difference between these two 
situations is the difference in the marital status of the 
two couple.
at 320.
In Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Aaencv. 301 A.2d 754 
(N.J. 1973), the court found that a landlord's denial of a rental 
opportunity to an individual solely because of that individual's 
desire to live with another woman violated a housing statute. Id. a 
756. If two unmarried women there fell under the protection of 
marital status, the same rationale requires this Court to protect 
unmarried couples. See also Loveland v. Leslie. 583 P.2d 664 (Wash. 
App. 1978) .
"[W]here California law parallels sister State legislation on 
the same subject, and there is no relevant California judicial 
authority interpreting California Law, the judicial interpretation b 
the sister State courts of their legislation may be relevant in 
construing the California legislation." Webster v. State Bd. of 
Control, 197 Cal. App. 3d 29, 37 n.3 (1987). The guidance provided 
in the aforementioned cases is relevant in construing the meaning of 
section 12955 as protecting unmarried couples in the instant case.
D. Cases which allow discrimination against unmarried couples
under marital status provisions are distinguishable.
Several states with legislation similar to section 12955 have 
found that unmarried couples are not protected by the marital status 
ambit, however, these cases are distinguishable. For example, in 
.«ptate V. French. 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990), reh'a denied Oct. 8,
1990, the court found that a statute which prohibited housing 
discrimination based on marital status failed to protect an unmarried 
couple. Id. at 5. The court wrote at great length to point out the 
legislative history and legislative intent of the statute in light of 
the state's anti-fornication laws. Id. at 5-6. The court looked to 
its own extensive body of case law and also pointed out Minnesota's 
preference and policy favoring traditional marriages. Id^ at 6-11. 
Finally, the court rested its decision upon the Minnesota 
Constitution's unique and exceedingly broad protective language, 
which provides that "[tjhe right of every man to worship God 
according to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be 
infringed . . . but the liberty of conscience . . . shall not . . .
excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with 
the peace or safety of the state." Minn. Const, art. I, §16. Thus, 
because Minnesota had a policy against fornication when the housing 
statute was enacted and because California has never had one, French 
is readily distinguishable and should not persuade this Court. See 
id. at 5-6.
Similarly, Bachman v. State Division of Human Rights. 104 A.D.2d 
111 {N.Y. 1984) and County of Dane v. Norman. 497 N.W.2d 714 (Wis.), 
reh'g denied sub nom. Dane Countv v. Norman. 505 N.W.2d 142 (Wis.
1993), are distinguishable. Both decisions consider the history of
the states' anti-fornication laws and policy against unmarried 
cohabitation. California by contrast, has never adopted anti- 
fornication laws; instead, this state has recognized the rights of 
unmarried cohabiting partners. See Marvin. 18 Cal. 3d at 665.
Many states deciding whether unmarried couples fall under the 
ambit of marital status have found protection for this group. Hess, 
138 Cal. App. 3d at 235; Swanner. 874 P.2d at 278; Desilets, 636 
N.E.2d at 320. The few states that have not afforded similar 
protection have based their decisions on their state's legislative 
history and policies against unmarried couples in favor of 
traditional marital structure. See French. 460 N.W.2d at 5-6;
Bachman. 104 A.D.2d at 115; Norman. 497 N.W.2d at 718.
Therefore, FEHA's marital status category protects unmarried 
couples. The legislature's intent to protect unmarried couples flov;s 
from the legislative history of FEHA, the construction of the statute 
itself, as well as judicial interpretation of the provision.
Moreover, equality and justice support protection of unmarried 
couples against housing discrimination under section 12955.
II . THE SMITH "INCIDENTAL EFFECTS" TEST PROVIDES THE APPROPP.IATF
LE\^EL OF JUDICIAL SCRUTINY TO DETERMINE l^^HETHER TO EXEMPT SMT~H
FROM SECTION 12955'S PROSCRIPTION AGAINST MARITAL STATUS
DISCRIMINATION BASED UPON HER ASSERTED RELIGIOUS BELIEFS.
The United States Supreme Court established the appropriate 
level of judicial scrutiny to apply in the instant case where a free 
exercise right is implicated. In Smith, the Court held that if a 
generally applicable and neutral law incidentally burdens an 
individual's religious beliefs, "the First Amendment has not been 
offended." Smith. 494 U.S. at 878. Following Smith. this Court
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should apply the "incidental effects" test to assess the validity of 
section 12955 .
The Smith test applies because RFRA is unconstitutional and
because California courts have always looked to federal Supreme Court
law in analyzing free exercise claims. Thus, this Court should
continue to employ federal case law. Since Smith is the leading
federal case, Smith applies here.
A. Because the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
improperly exceeds its authority bv attempting to usurp
the judiciary's responsibility of interpreting the federal
constitution. RFRA violates the basic concept of 
separation of powers and accordingly is unconstitutional^
"It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is." Marburv v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,
177 (1803); see also The Federalist No. 78, at 334 {Alexander
Hamilton) (Charles A. Beard ed., 1964) ("[t]he interpretation of the
laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts"). Marburv‘s
progeny has continued to affirm and solidify this essential holding.
See Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. 186 (1962); United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683 (1974). In Baker. the Court affirmed its "responsibility .
. . as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution[]." Baker, 369 U.S.
at 211. Likewise, the Nixon Court ruled that
[n]otwithstanding the deference each branch must accord to the 
others, the "judicial power of the United States" vested in the 
federal courts by Article III, [section] 1, of the Constitution 
[cannot] be shared .... Any other conclusion would be 
contrary to the basic concept of separation of powers and the 
checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite 
government. We therefore affirm that it is the province and 
duty of this Court "to say what the law is . . .
Nixon. 418 U.S. at 703-04.
In the instant case. Congress attempts through RFRA to overturn 
the Supreme Court’s virtual elimination in Smith of "the requirement
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that government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by 
laws neutral toward religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (West Supp. 
1995). RFRA by contrast mandates that government shall not 
"substantially burden a person's free exercise of religion" unless 
the government demonstrates that the burden imposed furthers a 
"compelling governmental interest" by the "least restrictive means." 
Id. at § 2000bb-l. RFRA's purpose, therefore, is "to restore the 
compelling interest test as set forth in gherb^rt V- • • ■
and Wisconsin v. Yoder . . . and to guarantee its application in all 
cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened."
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b). Rather than defining the terms 
"substantially burden" and "compelling government interest,"
Congress intended that "the courts will look to free exercise cases 
decided prior to Smith for guidance in determining" the meaning of 
such terms. S. Rep. No. Ill, 103d Cong. 1st Sess. 8 (1993), 
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898. Inasmuch as Congress 
attempts to set the judicial standard of review to be applied in 
interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, RFRA exceeds its 
constitutional authority. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703-04; Baker, 359 
U.S. at 211; Marburv. 5 U.S. at 177. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
impliedly overruled RFRA through its decision in Smith. See 
Marbury. 5 U.S. at 177.
In Flores v. City of Boerne. 877 F. Supp. 355, 357 (W.D. Tex. 
1995), the court reaffirmed the judiciary's duty as sole interpreter 
of the Constitution, and accordingly, struck-down RFRA. "RFRA 
violates the United States Constitution and Supreme Court precedent 
by unconstitutionally challenging the burden of proof as established 
under fSmith); Smith remains the law in this area for this Court to
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follow pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis." Id. at 357-58. 
Consequently, RFRA is unconstitutional and inapplicable to the 
instant case.2
B. California’s free exercise guarantees are coextensive with
federal constitutional protections, and thus the 
construction placed bv the United States Supreme Court
upon free exercise challenges applies here.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states: 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. Const, amend. I.
The California Constitution states: "Free exercise and enjoyment of 
religion without discrimination or preference are guaranteed. This 
liberty of conscience does not excuse acts that are licentious or 
inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State. ..." Cal. 
Const, art. I, § 4. The language of both constitutions provides 
equivalent protection against free exercise violations.
Although a state is free to provide more protection than the 
federal constitution, both constitutions here provide equivalent 
protection. Moreover, in Molko v. Holv Spirit Association for the 
Unification of World Christianity. 46 Cal. 3d 1092 (1988), cert 
denied. 490 U.S. 1084 (1989), this Court looked exclusively to United
- In addition. Congress lacks the power to enact RFRA. "RFRA is a bare
standard of review yoked to no particular substantive policy arena v.lthin which 
Congress is constitutionally empowered to act." Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act Letting the Fox into the Henhouse Under Cover of Sect::.on
S of the Fourteenth Amendment. 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 357, 364 (1994). Compare the 
Civil Rights Act, where Congress acted pursuant to the Commerce Clause and 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with RFRA, where 
Congress promulgated regulations pursuant to the First Amendment which is not an 
enumerated power but only a limitation on Congressional action. Id. at 365.
"The First Amendment does not empower Congress to regulate federal law in order 
to achieve religious liberty unless it does so pursuant to an enum.erated power." 
Id ■ at 36 2. Thus, only section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment can serve as basis 
to em.power Congress to enact RFR.i. Id. at 362. Congress, however, failed to 
reference section 5, and consequently, RFRA is unconstitutional since it lacks a 
recognized power source. Id. at 357.
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States Supreme Court cases when ruling on a free exercise claim. Id. 
at 1112. In taking this approach, the Court impliedly found that the 
two Constitutions provide the same protection. Id. at 1113. In 
People V. Woody. 61 Cal. 2d 716 (1964), this Court again looked 
exclusively to the federal constitution and United States Supreme 
Court law to resolve a free exercise issue. Id. at 718. This 
tradition of deferring to the United States Constitution is well 
established in California. See Molko. 46 Cal. 3d at 1112; Woody. 61 
Cal. 2d at 718.
"Cogent reason must exist before a state court in construing a 
provision of the state constitution will depart from the construction 
placed by the Supreme Court of the United States on a similar 
provision in the federal [c]onstitution." Raven v. Deukmeiian. 52 
Cal. 3d 336, 353 (1990) {quoting Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker. 12 Cal. 
2d 85, 89 (1938), cert, denied. 306 U.S. 621 (1939)). The court 
cited authority supporting this assertion and indicated its intent tc 
follow this policy, provided no good cause existed for departure or 
deviation. Id.
The United States Supreme Court has a long standing policy of 
recognizing a state’s power to enforce laws which do not conflict 
with the federal constitution. Jacobson v. Massachusetts. 197 U.S. 
11, 11 (1905). If this Court allows the state constitution to 
govern, the "incidental effects" test required by Smith would not 
necessarily apply. Such a result would contravene federal 
constitutional law and subject this Court to review by the United 
States Supreme Court.
C. Section 12955 does not present a "hybrid situation” but
rather solely encompasses a free exercise claim
unconnected with any communicative activity, therefore the
Smith "incidental effects" test is the appropriate
standard to apply in the instant case.
"[N]ot the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise 
Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as 
freedom of speech" presents a "hybrid situation" where only 
compelling state interests justify governmental action burdening 
religious practice. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-83. Conversely, the 
absence of a "hybrid situation" subjects a neutral, generally 
applicable lav; to the less rigorous "incidental effects" test. Id. 
The Court in Smith referred to two examples of hybrid cases involving 
compelled free speech and free exercise rights. Id. at 882 (citing
Woolev v._Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (invalidating compelled
display of a license plate slogan that offended individual religious 
beliefs); West Virginia Bd. of Education v. Barnette. 319 U.S. 624 
(1943) (invalidating compulsory flag salute challenged by religious 
objectors)) .
The instant case does not encompass a "hybrid situation."
Whereas the regulations in Woolev and Barnette specifically required 
an individual to engage in certain expressive activities (i.e., 
displaying state motto on car license plates or saluting American 
flag at school), the explicit provisions of section 12955 neither 
m.ention nor implicate any free expression rights. See Woolev. 430 
U.S. at 715; Barnette. 319 U.S. at 626. Rather, the Commission's 
order compelling Smith to post notices on her property created the 
free speech issue here. Accordingly, remission of the notice 
requirements, as the Commission has offered to do, eliminates both
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the free speech issue and the concomitant '’hybrid situation." See 
Smith. 494 U.S. at 881-83.
Since the remedy imposed by the Commission is "clearly severable 
from the purported free exercise claim[,]’’ the Smith "incidental 
effects" test provides the appropriate standard to analyze the 
validity of section 12955's anti-discriminatory regulations. See 
Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n. 34 Cal. App. 4th at 1737 
(Raye, J., concurring).
D. Alternatively, this Court mav apply the Sherbert-Yoder
"compelling interest" test by asserting independent
grounds.
This Court may alternatively apply the Sherbert-Yoder 
"compelling interest" test by asserting independent state grounds. 
This would require the Court to follow pre-Smith federal and state 
cases as a matter of state constitutional law. Auto Equity Sales y. 
Superior Court. 57 Cal. 2d 450, 455 (1962).
III. APPLICATION OF EITHER THE SMITH "INCIDENTAL EFFECTS" TEST OR
SHERBERT-YODER "COMPELLING INTEREST" TEST DOES NOT RELIEVE
OF HER OBLIGATION TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 12955. NQTl-JITHSTAND'MC
HER FREE EXERCISE LIBERTIES.
Under the Smith test, enforcement of section 12955 does not 
offend the right to the free exercise of religion due to the 
statute's generally applicable, neutral nature, despite any 
incidental burden imposed on Smith's religious practice. See Smith. 
494 U.S. at 886 n.3.
Even if this Court applies the more rigorous Sherbert-Yoder 
"compelling interest" test, Smith's religious beliefs do not excuse 
her from complying with section 12955's discriminatory prohibitions: 
California's narrowly tailored compelling interest in eradicating 
arbitrary housing discrimination and ensuring all persons free access
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to housing outweigh the relative burden placed upon Smith's religious 
convictions. See Yoder. 406 U.S. at 214-15; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at
406-09.
A. Under the Smith "incidental effects" test, enforcement of
section 12955 does not violate Smith's free exercise
rights because the statute is neutral and generally
applicable.
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment precludes 
Congress from passing laws which prohibit the free exercise of 
religion. U.S. Const, amend. I. This provision binds the states by 
its incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment through the Due 
Process Clause. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
Unlike the absolute protection granted to freedom of belief, courts 
afford only limited protection to conduct dictated by religious 
belief. Smith. 494 U.S. at 890; Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 402-03.
Smith defined the boundaries of that protection, stating that "if 
prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is . . . merely the
incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid 
[law], the First Amendment has not been offended." Smith, 494 U.S. 
at 878. The Smith test in effect "relegates a . . . First Amendment
value to the barest level of minimum scrutiny." Id. at 894 
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (citations omitted).
In Smith. the Court held that the application of Oregon's drug 
law^s criminalizing ingestion of peyote for sacramental purposes did 
not violate respondent's religious freedom. Id. at 878. 
Consequently, Oregon could constitutionally deny unemployment 
benefits to persons discharged for using peyote since religious 
belief did not place conduct "beyond the reach of a criminal law 
that is not specifically directed at [the] religious practice." Id.
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The Court reaffirmed this standard three years later, holding that 
"a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has 
the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice." 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Ave. Inc, v. City of Hialeah, — U.S.
__ 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2226 (1993}.
Smith cannot be distinguished from the instant case on the 
grounds that its rule applies only to free exercise challenges of 
criminal prohibitions. The language in Smith as well as recent 
federal and state court opinions compel the rejection of this 
argument. See Smith. 494 U.S. at 885 ("government's ability to 
enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful 
conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public 
policy, cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental 
action on a religious objector's spiritual development"}.-’ Thus, the 
Smith test permits enforcement of section 12955, if it operates in a 
neutral and generally applicable manner. See id. at 878.
A law fails the neutrality inquiry if it "refers to a religious 
practice without a secular meaning discernible from the language of 
context." Church of Lukumi Babalu Ave. 113 S. Ct. at 2227. Section 
12955 neither singles out a religious group nor acts as a pretext to 
impede a particular religious practices, thereby satisfying the
See also Vandiver v. Hardin Countv Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927, 932 (b-h 
Cir. 1991) (extending Smith test to a state law requiring religious home-study 
students to pass equivalency examinations); Salvation Army v. NewVIersev Pep't of 
Community Affairs. 919 F.2d 183, 194-96 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying Smith test to 
housing regulations operated by religious group) ; St. Bartholomew'_s_.Ch.urch v.
City of New York. 914 F.2d 348, 354 (2d Cir. 1990), cert, denied sub nom. 
Committee to Oppose Sale of St. Bartholomews Church. Inc, v. Rector. Ward^rg
Members of Vestrv of St. Bartholomew's Church. 499 U.S. 905 (1991) (employing 
Smith test to city landmark preservation ordinance pertinent to church property’; 
Black V. Svr.der. 471 N.V.U2d 715, 719 (Minn. App. 1991) (applying Smith test to 
civil claims, including breach of contract, defamation, and harassment).
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neutrality requirement. See id. Likewise, the prohibitions 
included in section 12955 are not specific to any religious group; 
instead, the provisions apply to all owners of housing 
accommodations and accordingly fulfill the general applicability 
requirement. See id.
Therefore, despite its unintended effect of burdening Smith's 
free exercise rights by requiring her to observe California's anti- 
discrimination laws which protect unmarried cohabitants in the 
housing context, enforcement of section 12955 is constitutional 
since the statute is a generally applicable, religion-neutral lav:.
See id. at 2226; Smith. 494 U.S. at 886 n.3.
B. Under the Sherbert-Yoder ''compelling interest" test,
California's narrowly tailored compelling interest in
abolishing arbitrary housing discrimination outweighs the
burden imposed upon Smith’s religious liberties, and thus
enforcement of section 12955 does not impermissibly burden
Smith’s right to the free exercise of her religion.
To determine the validity of a government regulation using the 
framework of the "compelling interest" test, a court must decide 
whether the regulation burdens a sincerely held religious belief; 
whether the burden is justified by a compelling state interest; and 
whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div. . 450 U.S. 707, 
718 (1981); Yoder. 406 U.S. at 214-15; Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 403; 
accord 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
Although section 12955 burdens Smith's free exercise of 
religion, that burden must give way to California's compelling 
interest in eradicating arbitrary housing discrimination and ensuring 
unencumbered access to housing. See Thomas. 450 U.S. at 718; Yoder. 
406 U.S. at 214-15; Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 403. In addition, granting
27
an exemption to Smith abrogates these overriding interests. See Lee, 
455 U.S. at 259-60; Thomas. 450 U.S. at 717-18; Braunfeld, 366 U.S. 
at 605. As such, section 12955 does not offend Smith's right to free 
exercise under either the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution or Article I, Section 4 of the California Constitution. 
See Thomas. 450 U.S. at 718; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214-15; Sherbert. 374 
U.S. at 403.
1, Section 12955 might burden Smith's sincerely held
religious beliefs, but her voluntary choice to engage
in the secular activity of renting apartment 
accommodations significantly diminishes that burden.
The preliminary inquiry in determining whether a state 
regulation unconstitutionally burdens the free exercise rights of an 
individual focuses upon, first, the sincerity of the adherent’s 
belief, and second, whether implementation of the regulation 
interferes with the exercise of religion. Hobbie v. Unemployment 
Appeals Comm'n of Fla.. 480 U.S. 136, 137 (1987); Lee, 455 U.S at 
256-57; Thomas. 450 U.S. at 715. Regarding the first requirement, 
the Commission does not contest the sincerity of Smith's convictions 
that renting to unmarried cohabitants who engage in sex constitutes a 
sin. See Hobbie. 480 U.S. at 137; Lee. 455 U.S at 256-57; Thomas.
450 U.S. at 715.
The second preliminary requirement questions whether the 
regulation burdens the free exercise of religion. An affirmative 
obligation or a prohibition in conjunction with sanctions burdens a 
person's religious freedom by forcing that person to act at odds with 
fundamental religious beliefs. Lee. 455 U.S. at 261; Thomas, 450 
U.S. at 717-18; Yoder. 406 U.S. at 218. In the instant case, Smith's 
choice between adhering to her religious beliefs and complying with
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section 12955's discriminatory prohibitions imposes a burden on her 
religious beliefs. See Lee. 455 U.S. at 261; Thomas. 450 U.S. at 
717-18; Yoder. 406 U.S. at 218
Accordingly, the statute can only survive judicial scrutiny if
the importance of the governmental interest outweighs the severity of
the burden imposed on Smith's free exercise rights. See Molko. 46
Cal. 3d at 1113 (citing Yoder. 406 U.S. at 214).
However, Smith’s voluntary entrance into a commercial activity
unconnected to her religious beliefs diminishes the severity of the
infringement on her free exercise rights. See Lee. 455 U.S. at 261.
In Lee. the Court commented that
every person cannot be shielded from all burdens incident to 
exercising every aspect of the right to practice religious 
beliefs. When followers of a particular sect enter into 
commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they 
accept on their own conduct as matter of conscience and faith 
are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are 
binding on others in that activity.
Id. In the present case, profit motivates Smith’s conduct, not
religious belief. When Smith engaged in the purely secular activity
of renting her apartment units to the general public, she subjected
herself to the legislature’s prescribed regulations governing housing
accommodations designed to eliminate pernicious discrimination. See
id. Therefore, Smith’s voluntary entrance into the rental
marketplace, where the state's anti-discriminatory regulations govern
her conduct, significantly decreases the burden imposed on her
religious beliefs. See id.
The Alaska Supreme Court found this rationale persuasive when it 
confronted an identical situation in which a landlord sought an 
exemption from an Alaska statute prohibiting marital status 
discrimination in housing. Swanner. 874 P.2d at 283. The court
29
concluded that enforcement of the statute did not violate the 
landlord’s free exercise rights because his voluntary choice to entej- 
into state regulated commercial activities caused the purported 
burden. Id. at 284. Thus, " [v] oluntary commercial activity does no*- 
receive the same status accorded to directly religious activity."
Id.
2. Section.12955 advances California's compelling
jinterest in eradicating invidious housing 
discrimination and ensuring free access to the
market■
A compelling interest encompasses only those interests "of the 
highest order," Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215, or "of sufficient magnitude 
to override the interest claiming protection," id. at 214, or 
"essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest." Lee. 
455 U.S. at 257-58. Satisfaction of one of these requirements 
justifies infringement upon religious belief, so long as less 
restrictive means do not otherwise serve the governmental interest. 
Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-58; Thomas. 450 U.S. at 718; Yoder. 406 U.S. at 
214-15; Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 406.
In Bob Jones University v. United States. 461 U.S. 574 (1983), 
the Court recognized a compelling government interest in eliminating 
invidious discrimination. Id. at 602. Bob Jones University defended 
its discriminatory practice of excluding certain races under the 
banner of the Free Exercise Clause. Notwithstanding both the 
sincerity of the University's religious beliefs and the burden 
imposed upon those beliefs by forcing the University to admit student 
of all races, the Court embraced the government's compelling interest 
in eliminating discrimination based on race. Id. 602-04. The 
government's fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating
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invidious discrimination substantially outweighed the University's 
free exercise rights. Id.
Similarly, the Lee Court upheld the government’s refusal to 
exempt Amish employers from paying Social Security taxes. Lee. 455 
U.S at 254. Despite impinging on Amish religious freedoms by forcing 
their compliance with a Social Security tax, the Court ruled that the 
government had a compelling interest in enforcing participation in 
the Social Security system in order to preserve the fiscal vitality 
of that system. Id. at 259-61. This vital interest, the Court held, 
outweighed the Amiish employers' right to the free exercise of 
religion. Id. at 260-61.
The Court in Braunfeld held that although a Sunday closing law 
undoubtedly served to make the practice of an Orthodox Jewish 
merchant's religious practice more expensive by prohibiting his 
retail sale of certain items on Sunday, a countervailing strong state 
interest in providing one uniform day of rest for all workers saved 
the statute. Braunfeld. 366 U.S. at 605. The Court found that the 
state could achieve that secular objective only by declaring Sunday 
as the recognized day of rest. Id.
By contrast, an employer in Sherbert fired a Seventh Day 
Adventist for refusing to work on Saturdays due to her religious 
beliefs. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 400-02. In accordance with its 
eligibility laws, the State of South Carolina denied her application 
for employment benefits for her failure to accept Saturday work. Id. 
The Court held that this denial violated her right to the free 
exercise of religion. Id. at 410. Unlike the state in Braunfeld. 
South Carolina failed to assert any interest justifying its
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unemployment eligibility regulations, thereby securing the 
constitutional infirmity of the statute. Id. at 407.
In the instant case, California asserts a compelling interest in 
enforcing section 12955's proscription against arbitrary housing 
discrimination. Enforcing the provision supports two related 
governmental interests: an interest in preventing individual acts of 
discrimination based on irrelevant characteristics, and an interest 
in ensuring equal access to housing for all persons. Cal. Gov't Code 
§§ 12920 and 12955; see Swanner. 874 P.2d at 282. The legislature 
broadened its protection of these interests when it amended section 
12955 in 1975 and placed unmarried couples within its protective 
umbrella. See Hess. 138 Cal. App. 3d at 235; Atkisson. 59 Cal. App.
3d at 99.
California's interest most closely parallels the interest at 
issue in Bob Jones Oniversitv. Just as the federal government there 
sought to eradicate invidious educational discrimination based on 
race, here California seeks to uproot arbitrary housing 
discrimination based on marital status. See Bob Jones Univ.. 461 
U.S. at 604. In both cases, the commodities in question (education 
and housing) represent basic human necessities which evei^' person has 
a right to receive without regard to irrelevant personal 
characteristics. Cal. Gov't Code § 12920 {’’the practice of 
discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, marital status, 
national origin, or ancestry in housing accommodations is declared to 
be against public policy"); Cal. Educ. Code § 200 (West 1994) ("it is 
the policy of the state of California to afford all persons . . .
equal rights and opportunities in the educational institutions of the 
state").
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Courts have further acknowledged a compelling state interest in
eradicating forms of discrimination other than racial prejudice.
.gee. e ■ g. . Roberts v. United States Javcees. 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984)
(gender); Gav Rights Coalition v_^ Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 38
(D.C. App. 1987) (sexual orientation); see also EEOC v. Pacific Press
Publishing Ass'n. 676 F.2d 1272, 1280 (9th Cir. 1982) ("elimination
of all forms of discrimination [is of the] highest priority"). In
Roberts. the United States Jaycees, an all-male civic and service
organization, argued that a Minnesota law forbidding discrimination
on the basis of sex abridged their First Amendment associational
rights by requiring the organization to accept women as members.
Roberts. 468 U.S. at 615. The Court found that the state's
commitment to eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens
equal access to publicly available goods plainly served a compelling
interest of the highest order. Id. at 624.
"[Ejven if enforcement of the Act causes some incidental 
abridgment of the Jaycees' protected [rights], that effect 
is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the state’s 
legitimate purposes. . . . [A]cts of invidious discrimination
in the distribution of publicly available goods . . . cause 
unique evils that government has a compelling interest to 
prevent . . . ."
Id. at 628.
Likewise, the state regulation here, which prohibits an owTier of 
any housing accommodation from discriminating against a person on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex, marital status, national origin, 
ancestry, familial status, or disability, furthers a compelling state 
interest to prevent individual acts of pernicious discrimination and 
to provide a decent home and suitable living environment. Cal. Gov’t 
Code §§ 12920 and 12955; s^ Bob Jones Univ.. 461 U.S. at 604;
Roberts. 468 U.S. at 628. The plain language of section 12955 does
not demote marital status discrimination to a lower level of 
protection, nor does any evidence suggest that the legislature 
contemplated such a construction. See supra part I.A.3. Once 
legislatures choose which groups deserve protection, "a court cannot 
lightly dispute a determination by the political branches that the
interests at stake are compelling." Finzer v._Barry, 798 F.2d 1450,
1459 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert, granted sub nom. Boos v. Barry, 479 U.S- 
1083 (1987) .
The governmental interest in the instant case is distinguishable 
from the state's interest in enacting statutes favoring the rights of 
married couples."* Here the unique and limited state objective 
centers on the elimination of marital status discrimination in the 
housing context, not eradicating marital status discrimination in all 
general settings. Furthermore, "[t]he state's policy in favor of 
marriage . . . does not imply a corresponding policy against
nonmarital relationships." Norman v. Unemployment Ins._Appeals Bd. ,
34 Cal. 3d 1, 14 (1983) (Broussard, J., dissenting). A belief that 
only married couples can create families which promote society’s 
interests "ignore[s] the reality of our evolving social fabric and 
the corresponding accommodations made in both statutory and 
decisional law." Elden. 46 Cal. 3d at 281 (Broussard, J., 
dissenting) (citing Marvin. 18 Cal. 3d 660 (voluntary obligation
■* E.q. ■ Elden v. .Sheldon. 46 Cal. 3d 267 (1988) (no cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress or loss of consortium by unmarried 
cohabitants); In re Cummings. 30 Cal. 3d 870 (1982 ) (no conjugal visitation 
rights for unmarried couples); Beatv v. Truck Ins. Exch.. 6 Cal. App. 4th 145E' 
(1992), review denied Aug. 27, 1992 (no right to joint umbrella insurance 
coverage for unmarried couples); Hinman v. Deo't of Personnel Admin.. 167 Cal. 
App. 3d 516 (1985) (no entitlement to dental benefits available to family members 
for unmarried partners); Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co.. 133 Cal. App. 3c 89C 
(1982 ) (no right to bring wrongful death action on behalf of cohabiting partner) : 
People v. Delnh. 94 Cal. App. 3d 411 (1979) (no marital communications privilegc- 
for unmarried couples) .
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undertaken by unmarried cohabitants recognized by courts); Cal. Gov't 
Code § 12955 (a) - (d) , {f} {rights of unmarried couples in the field of 
housing); Cal. Gov't Code § 12955(e) (in the field of credit for 
housing); Cal. Civ. Code §§ 7000-7021 (West 1983) (in the field of 
family relations)). "The trend in this state is toward removing 
legal distinctions based on marital status that serve only to burden 
the unmarried without advancing some corresponding societal 
interest." I.d. Additionally, refusing to protect cohabiting couples 
who could not otherwise choose marriage, i.e., same-sex couples, 
fails to further any state interest. See id. see also supra part 
I.C.
To be sure, a corollary interest in safeguarding a legally 
protected privacy interest in marital status reinforces the state's 
objective of protecting against marital status discrimination in 
housing accommodations. See Atkisson. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 98-100.
The California Constitution creates a right of action against private 
parties who intrude into the realm of private action. Cal. Const, 
art. I, § 1. Smith's constructive inquiry into the marital status of 
Phillips and Randall violated their constitutionally protected right 
of privacy. See Atkisson. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 98-100; Hill v.
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n.. 7 Cal. 4th 1, 20 (1994). 
Moreover, toleration of Smith's rental policy which seriously invades 
a potential tenant's privacy right in his or her marital status, 
permits encroachment upon California's constitutional right to 
privacy. See Hill. 7 Cal. 4th at 20.
Thus, on one side of the scale lie Smith's religious freedoms. 
Smith's voluntary choice to enter the public marketplace reduces the 
critical mass of this weight as she cannot superimpose her religious
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beliefs onto g'overnmental enactments which regulate her commercial 
conduct. ^ U.S. at 261; Swanner, 874 P.2d at 283. On the
other side of the scale sits California’s compelling interest in 
eradicating marital status discrimination in the housing context and 
ensuring equal access to all housing accommodations. The 
constitutional balance tips in favor of the state's overriding 
interest: Smith's free exercise rights must give way to enforcement 
of section 12955's provisions protecting unmarried couples against 
discrimination, so long as no less intrusive means serve the state's 
interest. Yoder. 406 U.S. at 214-15; Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 436.
As discussed in part I.C-D, other state courts have dealt with 
this same issue on similar but not identical facts. The Alaska 
Supreme Court in Swanner applied the "compelling interest" test and 
held that enforcement of a state regulation prohibiting marital 
status discrimination in housing did not violate a landlord’s right 
to free exercise of religion under the Alaska Constitution. .Swanner.
874 P.2d at 284.
In contrast, the Minnesota Supreme Court in French, granted a 
landlord an exemption from the state's anti-discrimination statute. 
French. 460 N.W.2d at 9. The court's holding centered on several 
distinguishing factors set out in part I.D.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Desilets. also held that the 
state failed to show a compelling interest in its anti-discrimination 
statute sufficient to justify the burden imposed on a landlord's 
religious beliefs. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 241. However, the court 
confined its ruling to a summary judgment motion: "we conclude that 
the . . . facts disclose no basis for ruling that the Commonwealth 
can or cannot meet its burden of establishing that it has a
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compelling interest [;] . . . neither side is entitled to summary 
judgment." Id. at 241.
3. Uniform enforcement of section 12955 provides the
least intrusive means to advance the state's
compelling interest in eliminating discrimination
against unmarried couples such that recognition of a
religious exemption would substantially frustrate that
interest.
To survive strict scrutiny, a state must show that no less 
restrictive means achieve ;‘s declared interest. Thomas. 450 U.S. at 
718; Sherbert, 374 U.S. a: -^O' . This requirement turns on whether 
the governmental objective will suffer if the state must grant an 
exemption to those individuals whose sincerely held religious beliefs 
are burdened. Thomas. 450 U.S. at 718; Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 407.
In Braunfeld. the Court held that the state could only achieve a 
Sunday closing law by declaring Sunday as the day of rest.
Braunfeld. 366 U.S at 605. "Requiring exemptions for Sabbatarians, 
while theoretically possible, appeared to present an administrative 
problem of such magnitude . . . that such a requirement would have 
rendered the entire statutory scheme unworkable." Sherbert. 374 U.S. 
at 408-09 (summarizing Braunfeld).
Similarly in Lee, the Court recognized the difficulty of 
accommodating the comprehensive Social Security system with a myriad 
of exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs. Lee. 
455 U.S. at 259.
The tax system could not function if denominations were allowed 
to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a 
manner that violates their religious beliefs. Because the broad 
public interest in maintaining a sound tax system is of such a 
high order, religious belief in conflict with the payment of 
taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax.
Id. at 260 (citations om.itted) .
The Court in Yoder, however, reversed a compulsory education 
recjuirement imposed on an Amish student on the grounds that granting 
an exemption would not undermine the state's goal of educating its 
citizens. Yoder. 406 U.S. at 235-36. The Court's decision relied 
heavily on the demonstrated adequacy of the Amish’s alternative mode 
of continuing education. Id, The Court concluded that an exemption 
must be granted unless the state explained how recognition of an 
exemption might adversely affect its strong interest in education.
Id. at 236.
Unlike Yoder. Smith's violation of section 12955 cannot be 
remedied by anything less than her withdrawal from the rental markei 
or her compliance with the regulation. See id. Granting an 
exemption here unduly frustrates and hinders the state's dual 
interest in eradicating housing discrimination against unmarried 
couples and providing access to housing for all residents. .See Lee. 
455 U.S. at 259; Braunfeld. 366 U.S. at 605-06; see also Bob Jones 
Univ. . 461 U.S. at 604 (free exercise exemption destroys governmental 
interest in preventing discrimination). Even if prospective tenants 
find alternative accommodations after a landlord rejects their 
application based on religious beliefs, the state still possesses an 
interest in preventing arbitrary acts of housing discrimination. See 
Swanner. 874 P.2d at 282.
As a matter of policy, allowing individuals to define their own 
standards of conduct in matters which involve society as a whole 
"precludes the very concept of ordered liberty." Yoder. 406 U.S. at 
215-16. Relieving citizens of their societal responsibility simply 
because they possess religious convictions which contradict the 
relevant concerns of a political society renders "the professed
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doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in 
effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."
Reynolds v. United States. 98U.S. 145, 167 (1879); see also Smith, 
494 U.S. at 888-90 ("parade of horribles" resulting from required 
exemptions) . Allowing Smith an exemption here opens too wide a door 
for abuse and permits, for example, a landlord to reject a rental 
applicant guilty of pride, covetousness, lust, anger, envy, gluttony, 
or sloth, since at least one religion holds that these actions 
constitute its capital sins. See Joseph Ratzinger, Cardinal, 
Catechism of the Catholic Church. 1866 (1994).
In short, because no less burdensome alternatives satisfy 
California’s compelling interest, the First Amendment and its 
California equivalent do not exempt Smith from her obligation to 
comply with section 12955. S^ Thomas. 450 U.S. at 718; Yoder, 406 
U.S. at 214-15; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the 
California court of appeal decision dismissing the compliant filed 
against Smith.
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